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T HERE were many interesting cases in the conflict of laws field during the
course of this survey period, although no major developments occurred.
To this author, however, with a great interest in the discipline of conflict of
laws, it is most disheartening to note the many cases reviewed herein where
either improper motion or no motion at all was made for judicial notice of
the applicable law of a sister state or where proper proof and pleading of the
applicable law of a foreign state was lacking. Are the lawyers of Texas
unprepared in the field of conflict of laws? Do they fitil to realize the
possibility that the law of a jurisdiction other than the Texas forum may well
be governing when a foreign fact element enters the case? Because Texas
courts presume the controlling law of other jurisdictions to be the same as
that of Texas in instances of absence of a motion for judicial notice of sister
state law or proof and pleading of foreign law, cases are being lost by failure
to bring those laws to the attention of the court.
I. JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS
Full Faith and Credit-Limitations. Olson v. Success Motivation Institute,
Inc.' involved a Wisconsin default judgment obtained by Olson against a
Texas corporation. Upon nonpayment Olson sought enforcement in a Texas
court. Defendant claimed that the judgment was void for lack of judicial
jurisdiction in Wisconsin and also that the judgment was barred by the
Wisconsin statute of limitation. The trial court agreed with these contentions,
but its decision was reversed upon appeal. The court of civil appeals
set forth the well-known presumption of the validity of a foreign judgment
once it is introduced into evidence, that is, that the plaintiff thereby
establishes a prima facie case which places upon the defendant the burden of
rebutting the validity of the judgment as void for want of jurisdiction. 2 This
the defendant had failed to do. Moreover, the record contained no indication
of lack of jurisdiction but, to the contrary, showed compliance with the
Wisconsin long-arm statute.
As to the second point in issue, the Wisconsin statute of limitations
provides that execution may issue on a judgment within five years after
rendition. Thereafter execution is permitted only upon leave and discretion
of the court. Further, prior notice to the judgment debtor is required. 3
Because execution had not issued on the foreign judgment within the
five-year period, the trial judge found the judgment barred, dormant, and
unenforceable.
* B.S., Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas; LL.B., The University of Texas;
LL.M., S.J.D., University of Michigan. William Hawley Atwell Professor of Law, Southern
Methodist University.
1. 528 S.W.2d Ill (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICT OF LAWS 185 (1968).
3. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 272.04 (West 1958).
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A general rule of conflict of laws is that statutes of limitation are
regarded as procedural, and procedural matters are governed by the law of
the forum.4 Under this rule, since Texas was the forum for the enforcement
of the judgment, its limitations period would govern. Texas has a borrowing
statute, however, which bars action upon a foreign judgment in Texas if the
judgment is barred by the laws of the state where the judgment was
rendered.5 This statute is concerned with the time of bringing suit in Texas,
not with the time of the Texas court's hearing or rendition of judgment. In
Olson it was found that the Wisconsin judgment was rendered in 1965. Suit
on the judgment was brought in Texas in 1967 and six days later the
defendant filed its answer. At the time of bringing the suit in Texas the
judgment was less than seventeen months old and, therefore, was not barred
under the Wisconsin statute. In Texas the bringing of suit before the end of
the statutory period interrupts the running of that period. The record
contained neither a motion for the taking of judicial notice of Wisconsin law
nor proof of Wisconsin law on whether or not the running of the Wisconsin
statute would be tolled upon bringing of suit. 6 Texas law would thus govern
because in the absence of proof or motion for judicial notice of the sister
state law, which should govern the issue, Texas courts presume the sister
state law to be the same as that of Texas. 7 Hence, the Wisconsin five-year
period was tolled with the filing of the suit in Texas and the Wisconsin
judgment was not barred or unenforceable.
Full Faith and Credit-Irregularities in Rendition of Judgment. A collateral
attack in a Texas court was made on a Nebraska judgment in Hungate v.
Hungate.8 The Nebraska decree had determined that the widow and two
brothers of a deceased were his sole heirs. At the time of the decedent's
death proceedings to adopt a minor child by the deceased and his wife were
underway. After her husband's death the widow proceeded with the
adoption which was later granted. In the probate proceedings no guardian ad
litem was appointed to represent the child. As noted, the decree recognized
the widow and brothers as the only heirs. Thereafter, Mobil Oil Company
commenced an interpleader action in Texas and tendered into court certain
Texas oil interests which were the separate property of the husband. The
widow, the brothers, and the minor child were made parties. The widow and
brothers sought summary judgment grounded on the recognition of the
Nebraska decree and placed an authenticated copy of the decree in the
record. The attorney ad litem representing the child in the Texas proceeding
claimed that the child was not bound by the Nebraska decree and further
claimed that an equitable adoption existed so as to make the child an heir.
The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. Upon appeal this
judgment was affirmed.
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 122, 142 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
5. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5530 (Vernon 1958).
6. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 184a.
7. For discussion of this presumption see Thomas, Proof of Foreign Law in Texas, 25 Sw.
L.J. 554, 567-70 (1971).
8. 531 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).
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The appellate court determined that the case involved two issues. The
first was whether a minor could make a collateral attack upon a sister state
judgment affecting his interest when no guardian ad litem had been
appointed to represent him. Here the court expounded the rule that ir-
regularities or errors in the rendition of a judgment do not make the
judgment subject to collateral attack and unenforceable when recognition is
sought in a sister state. 9 A collateral attack and denial of full faith and credit
is possible only when the judgment is void.'" The court then went on to hold
that in Texas failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor child whose
interests are involved in a case makes the judgment voidable, not void. A
voidable judgment may be attacked directly on appeal but not collaterally. "
The full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution requires,
however, that the same conclusive effect be given a judgment as is given by
the law of the state in which it was rendered. 2 Consequently, Texas courts
must look to Nebraska law to determine whether a judgment is regarded
there as voidable and subject to direct attack or whether it is void and thus
subject to collateral attack. Once again the law of the place of rendition of
the judgment was not brought to the attention of the court either by a proper
motion for judicial notice of Nebraska law or by pleading such law. As
previously noted, in such instances the law of the place is presumed to be the
same as that of Texas, which does not permit collateral attack. 3
The second issue in Hungate concerned the burden of proof in an
attack upon a foreign judgment for lack of jurisdiction over a person claimed
to be bound thereby. In this instance there was a question as to whether the
Nebraska court had jurisdiction over the person of the minor child. The
record failed to show publication of the citation for three successive weeks
prior to the rendering of the final decree as required by Nebraska law.' 4 As
in the Olson case discussed previously, the court of civil appeals set forth
the rule that an authenticated judgment of a sister state when offered into
evidence creates a prima facie case, placing the burden upon the one
collaterally attacking the judgment to come forward with the evidence that
the judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction over his person because of
improper service. 5 Since evidence of this kind had not been offered, the
foreign judgment entitled the widow and the brothers to an instructed
verdict.
Full Faith and Credit-Finality of Authentication of Sister State Judgment.
In Schwartz v. Vecchiotti 6 suit was brought in Texas to enforce a judgment
of the State of New York. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the
judgment creditors. The judgment debtors appealed, asserting that the New
9. See, e.g., Aldrich v. Aldrich, 375 U.S. 75 (1%3).
10. See R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, at 184-85.
I I. Wallis v. Stuart, 92 TEX. 568, 50 S.W. 567 (1899).
12. The United States Code requires that judicial proceedings of a state shall have the same
full faith and credit in the courts of other states as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
state rendering them. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1970). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, §
105, Comment b.
13. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
14. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 30-1709, -1710 (1943).
15. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
16. 529 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston list Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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York judgment was not properly proved in that there was no certified copy
or other admissible evidence of the judgment to support the summary
judgment. In this case there was no certificate by a judge of a New York
court of record to the effect that the attesting officer had legal custody of the
judgment as required by article 3731a of the Texas statutes.' 7 Section 6 of
this article permits other forms of proof of official recording such as is
authorized by any applicable statute or by the rules of evidence at common
law. Thus the court pointed out that a sister state judgment may be
authenticated not only as prescribed by the specific statutory method, but
also by a witness who has compared the copy of the judgment placed in
evidence with the original entry of the judgment. When so proven the
examined copy is sufficient prima facie proof. There was an affidavit filed
by such a witness among the papers of the trial court and the court found that
the New York judgment was thus properly a part of the summary judgment
evidence before the trial court. Moreover, one of the defendants, acting as
representative of both defendants, attached an affidavit which showed an
appeal from the New York judgment in New York. The court of civil
appeals was of the opinion that the statements made in this affidavit
constituted a judicial admission of the accuracy of the essential elements of
the New York judgment and, therefore, the affidavit also was a proper part
of the evidence for summary judgment.
It was also claimed by the defendant judgment debtors that the New
York judgment was not a final, valid, and subsisting judgment in New York
for purposes of full faith and credit 8 in that there was no allegation or proof
of New York law as to the judgment's validity or finality. The defendants
then set forth the Texas rule which presumes the law of the place to be that of
Texas in the absence of proper motion for judicial notice or proof of sister
state law.' 9 Under Texas law a judgment must be signed by the judge.
In this case, unlike the two previous cases considered, a motion for
judicial notice of New York law had been filed and New York law had been
presented to the trial court in a memorandum. It was found that New York
would recognize this judgment as final even if subject to appeal unless the
defendant had filed a bond in the amount of judgment. The same rule was
said to prevail in Texas and, therefore, the judgment was final for purposes
of full faith and credit since no bond in the amount of judgment had been
filed. Because the question of regularity of judgment had not been raised at
the trial level, it was presumed that the trial judge had taken judicial notice
of the fact that under New York law there was a proper signing of the
judgment.
Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. A summary judgment by the trial court
which had failed to recognize a Lebanese judgment was before the Houston
court of civil appeals in Enterprises & Contracting Co. v. Plicoflex, Inc.2°
17. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3731a (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
18. The traditional view is that a judgment of a state must be final for enforcement in other
states. See H. GOODRICH & E. ScOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 404 (4th ed. 1964). See also Magnolia
Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
19. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
20. 529 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, no writ).
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Here the plaintiff-appellant sought to collect a judgment in Texas which had
been rendered in its favor against the defendant-appellee in Lebanon.
Defendant Plicoflex answered in the trial court by contending that the
Lebanese court had no personal jurisdiction over it. In support of its answer
Plicoflex submitted the affidavit of each of its officers which stated a lack of
knowledge of service of process upon any officer or agent of the company in
Lebanon or in the United States for purposes of this suit. The court of civil
appeals reversed and remanded the summary judgment of the trial court
which had been granted in favor of Plicoflex, stating that Plicoflex had not
sustained the burden of proving that it had not been properly served and,
therefore, as movant for the summary judgment it had not established the
non-existence of a material fact to entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law.
In order to reach this conclusion the Texas court applied the Texas
long-arm statute2 to determine requisites for service of process to support
Lebanese jurisdiction and a Lebanese judgment. This was a highly unusual
procedure at best, but Lebanese law was neither pleaded nor proved, and in
the absence of proper proof of the otherwise applicable law of the foreign
state, the law of that state is presumed by Texas law to be the same as that of
Texas.22 In this instance Texas article 2031a, which requires a foreign
corporation to appoint a resident of Texas to be its agent for service of
process in all suits brought against it in Texas, would apply. In the case at
hand the defendant-appellee did not deny that it did business in Lebanon,
nor did it deny that it had designated a resident agent for service of process.
Furthermore, it did not show clearly that such an agent was not served with
process in Lebanon. A fact issue existed as to whether there was a
designated agent and also whether he was served. In the presence of such
issues the trial court was held to have erred in granting the summary
judgment.
Custody Decrees. Lehmann v. Lehmann2 3 and Follak v. Brown24 are both
concerned with the problem of enforcing sister state custody decrees. It has
become accepted that such decrees are subject to full faith and credit except
as to matters showing changed circumstances since the date of such decree,
provided also, of course, that the court issuing the decree possesses the
proper jurisdictional basis.25 Generally speaking, the state of the child's
domicile, or the state where the child or parents are personally present, are
recognized as having jurisdictional power for purposes of custody awards.26
In the two cases at hand there was no question that judicial jurisdiction was
present at the time the custody award was rendered. The problem in these
cases centered around the fact that the court which had granted the original
decree had changed the custody of the children from one spouse to another.
21. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
22. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
23. 537 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
24. 530 S.W.2d 882 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
25. Kovacks v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604(1958); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610(1947). See also
R. LEFLAR, supra note 2, at 348; G. STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 322 (3d ed.
1963).
26. See, e.g., Justice Traynor's decision in Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197
P.2d 739 (1948). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 79.
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In each instance the children and the spouse against whom the custody
change was directed were no longer resident in the state the court of which
was ordering the change. Proper notice would appear to have been given in
each proceeding for change of custody. The courts of civil appeals applied
the usual rule that a court of a state rendering a custody decree retains
jurisdiction over the case so that the decree may be changed upon a showing
of changed condition. This would mean that a party effectively brought
before a court and subject to its jurisdiction remains subject to all further
proceedings necessarily concomitant of the case. 27 A continuing jurisdiction
ensues, and full faith and credit must be given to the change of custody
order.
In the Follak case the parties failed to invoke the law of South
Carolina, the state rendering the judgment. Thus, the question arose
whether South Carolina law provided for an exercise of continuing jurisdic-
tion for purposes of effectuating a changed custody decree. The Texas
courts presumed, in the absence of pleading or proof of South Carolina law
or of a motion for judicial notice of such law, that the law of South Carolina
was the same as that of Texas.28 Section 11.05(a) of the Texas Family
Code 29 recognizes that a court acquiring jurisdiction of a suit affecting the
parent-child relationship may exercise a continuing jurisdiction as to all
concomitant matters. Citation of this section creates another problem,
however, in that the statute calls for the exclusive jurisdiction of such court.
In other words, subject to certain limited exceptions, no other court would
appear to have jurisdiction to affect the parent-child relationship. Usually
courts of other states possessing jurisdiction can effectuate a change of
custody, despite an earlier award, upon a showing that changed conditions
demand a change of custody of the child.3" The court of civil appeals held
that the pleadings in this case raised no issue as to change of conditions
subsequent to the judgment of the South Carolina court. It then stated: "We
are not holding that the jurisdiction of the South Carolina court is exclu-
sive." 3' In other words, according to the court section 11.05(a) is not to be
given an extraterritorial application but is to be applied in Texas child
custody proceedings only.
The concurring opinion in the Follak case is of interest. Justice Keith
would hold that reliance upon the continuing jurisdiction concept was not
necessary to affirm the trial court's judgment. He would argue that actual in
personam jurisdiction existed over the nonresident father at the time of the
second custody decree in accordance with South Carolina long-arm proce-
dures and the theory proclaimed in Mitchim v. Mitchim. 32 The Mitchim
case involved an Arizona long-arm statute which permitted suit against a
nonresident defendant where the defendant had caused an event to occur in
27. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913); Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d
763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
28. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
29. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § l1.05(a) (Vernon 1975).
30. Plass v. Liethold, 454 S.W.2d 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1966, no writ); see H.
GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 18, at 273.
31. 530 S.W.2d at 885.
32. 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
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Arizona out of which the claim arose. The case was a divorce suit and events
in the state leading up to the divorce were considered sufficient contacts
with the state for purposes of the statute. Possibly the same could be said as
to the custody decree here, although no real facts were shown bearing upon
the matter and the South Carolina long-arm statute was not quoted or cited
although South Carolina law providing for service by registered mail was
introduced. Justice Keith did set forth the rule that the introduction of the
sister state judgment creates a prima facie case for the one relying thereon,
and the other party bears the burden to establish lack of jurisdiction in the
rendering state.3 Perhaps this rule, coupled with the Mitchim theory, was
the basis of the concurring opinion.
Support Judgment- "Bootstrap" Doctrine. Layton v. Layton34 is an
example of the last-in-time rule for inconsistent, conflicting judgments.
According to this principle, the judgment rendered last in time is to be
accorded full faith and credit despite the fact that an inconsistent judgment
has previously been rendered which should have been accorded full faith
and credit by the court rendering the later judgment. 35 In Layton the
husband obtained a divorce in Texas. By its judgment the Texas court also
divided the property, awarded child custody, and ordered the husband to
make support payments for the child. The wife, after receipt of out-of-state
notice in Maryland, appeared specially to challenge the jurisdiction. Her
challenge was overruled. Thereafter she filed no further pleadings and did
not enter her appearance in person or through an attorney.
Prior to receipt of notice of the Texas suit the wife brought suit in
Maryland for divorce a mensa et thoro, custody of children, child support,
and alimony. After the Texas decree had been rendered she amended the
complaint in Maryland seeking the same relief except for a change from
divorce a mensa et thoro to divorce a vinculo. The husband answered the
amended complaint stating that he was a resident of Texas and that service
of process had been made upon him by a serving of the summons on his
father, rather than the husband, while they were temporarily in Maryland. It
was claimed that such defective service was insufficient to obtain jurisdiction
over his person. It was further stated that the Texas divorce proceedings
were determinative of all issues of alimony, support, custody, and property.
His objections were overruled by the Maryland court with a finding by the
court that in personam jurisdiction had been obtained over him. The
Maryland decree contained an identical statement and a recital that the court
had considered the previous Texas decree. The Maryland decree awarded
custody of the children, payment by husband of child support and permanent
weekly alimony. It also ordered the husband to pay all arrearages of
child support, of alimony pendente lite, and attorney's fees. A divorce
decree was not entered. The husband failed to appeal from this decree.
Thereafter, in the same cause the wife filed a petition in the Maryland
33. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
34. 538 S.W.2d 642 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ).
35. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66(1939); Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730
(2d Cir. 1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 114.
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court for a determination of alimony and support arrearages and the
reduction of the amounts so determined to a money judgment. Such
judgment was rendered. This judgment recited that the husband had
personal notice of the wife's petition and that the court had acquired in
personam jurisdiction. This judgment was then brought to Texas for
enforcement. The district court refused to enforce the judgment. On appeal,
the court of civil appeals reversed, being of the opinion that full faith and
credit must be given to the Maryland judgment for unpaid installments and
child support.
The United States Constitution requires that full faith and credit be
given to a sister state judgment if the rendering court had jurisdiction over
the parties and the subject matter. 36 Such judgment is to be given the same
credit, validity, and effect as given by the state rendering it. 37 Thus, it seems
clear that the Maryland court failed to give full faith and credit to the Texas
judgment of support. Consequently, the Constitution of the United States
was violated. If, of course, the Texas court had no jurisdiction, full faith and
credit need not have been given. The Texas court of civil appeals, however,
found no reason to reject the finding of the trial court in the Texas divorce
proceeding that it had jurisdiction. Thus, the Maryland court failed to give
full faith and credit to the Texas judgment which should have been
determinative of the support rights of the wife after the divorce. The
question remained, however, whether the Texas courts could refuse to give
full faith and credit to this later Maryland judgment. The court's answer was
in the negative. The Texas court could by collateral attack inquire into the
jurisdiction of the Maryland court, and if the Maryland court lacked
jurisdiction, full faith and credit to the Maryland judgment would be
denied.3 8 But a failure of the Maryland court to give full faith and credit to
the prior Texas judgment did not deprive the Maryland court of jurisdiction,
no matter how erroneous the Maryland judgment might have been.
Moreover, the husband failed to raise in his pleadings the issue of a lack of in
personam jurisdiction over him. Even if Maryland lacked judicial jurisdic-
tion, the husband's appearance in the Maryland proceeding and his unsuc-
cessful litigation of the issue of jurisdiction barred him from relitigation in a
collateral attack. This is known as the "bootstrap" doctrine: When a
question of jurisdiction exists, if the defendant appears in the action and
litigates the issue or had opportunity to do so, the issue is res judicata in the
state where the court sits and is not subject to collateral attack in other
states.3 9
The court went on to say that the husband should have raised the failure
of the Maryland court to give full faith and credit to the prior Texas
judgment by way of appeal. An appeal, rather than a collateral attack, was
36. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
37. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945).
38. Gunther v. Gunther, 478 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
39. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106(1963); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343(1948); R. LEFLAR,
supra note 2, at 185-86.
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the correct way to remedy the constitutional error of the Maryland court.
Failure of that court to give full faith and credit to the prior Texas judgment,
in the words of the court, "does not justify retaliatory action by the Texas
courts. "40
This case follows the general rule and doctrine established by the
United States Supreme Court that if conflicting judgments are involved, the
later final judgment controls, even though the latter is one which could itself
have been reversed on appeal for violation of the full faith and credit
clause.4 1 It should be noted, however, that cases in other states do exist
whereby courts have refused to accord controlling effect and full faith and
credit to the latest final adjudication. 42
One further point is noteworthy in the Layton case. The district court
reasoned that full faith and credit should not be given to the Maryland decree
because it would be contrary to Texas public policy to permit permanent
alimony. Inasmuch as the public policy of a state is no defense against the
enforcement of a sister state judgment, 43 the appellate court declared that
when arrearages of alimony have been reduced to a final judgment by the
court granting the alimony, full faith and credit must be given to that
judgment."
Texas Long-Arm Statute. Estes Packing Co. v. Kadish & Milman Beef
Co. 45 is concerned with the Texas long-arm statute and the question of an
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation. The plaintiff
was a Texas corporation which sold beef to a Massachusetts corporation
through a broker. The beef was sent by truck for delivery to the Mas-
sachusetts company in Boston. Upon arrival of the beef the latter company
rejected a certain amount of the meat on the ground that it was not in good
condition but mailed its check to the Texas company in payment for the meat
accepted with an endorsement that the check was in full payment for all
debts incurred between the two companies. The Texas company refused to
accept the check with such endorsement and returned it. Suit was then
brought against the Massachusetts defendant under article 2031b. 46 The trial
court found a lack of jurisdiction. Upon appeal this decision was reversed
and remanded.
The court of civil appeals first inquired as to whether the terms of
article 2031b were met. In order to satisfy the statutory requirements the
nonresident defendant must be deemed to have been doing business in Texas
by entering into a contract with a resident of Texas to be performed in whole
or in part in Texas. The court concluded that these requirements had been
met because the invoice, the shipping manifest, and the bill of lading which
40. 538 S.W.2d at 647.
41. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
42. Porter v. Porter, 101 Ariz. 131, 416 P.2d 564 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967);
Colby v. Colby, 78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
43. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
44. 538 S.W.2d at 645; accord, Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944); Sistare v. Sistare, 218
U.S. I (1910).
45. 530 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).
46. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
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accompanied the shipment of meat showed that the meat belonged to the
plaintiff and that the plaintiff was offering the meat for sale to the defendant
at a certain specified price, and that the defendant accepted such price and
accepted part of the shipment. All the accepted meat was then resold by the
defendant, who sent a check to Texas for that part of the truckload. Thus, a
contract was entered into between the parties by which the defendant agreed
to buy from the plaintiff at plaintiff's price that part of the meat which the
defendant kept. This contract was the basis of the lawsuit, the plaintiff
Texas company desiring to recover from the nonresident defendant at least
the part of the price that the parties had agreed upon for the meat actually
purchased. The court noted that the shipping manifest which accompanied
the meat provided that all bills would be payable in Fort Worth. The court
held that this became a part of the contract. From these facts it was
determined that a contract had been made between the defendant, a
nonresident, and plaintiff, a Texas resident, for at least a part of the meat,
and this contract was to be partly performed in Texas by the agreement to
pay in Fort Worth.
Assuming that the terms of the Texas long-arm statute were fulfilled, a
second determination became requisite. It was necessary to conclude
whether or not minimum contacts were present in Texas so that the
maintenance of the suit would not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and justice," and would thereby meet the due process requirements of
International Shoe Co. v. Washington.47 Here the court set out the
three-tiered test of the Supreme Court of Texas in O'Brien v. Lanpar.A
According to this test, three basic factors exist for an exercise of jurisdiction.
The first such factor is that the nonresident defendant must purposefully do
some act or consummate some transaction in the state. Under the
second factor, the cause of action must arise from or be connected with the
said act or transaction, and the third requirement is that the assumption of
jurisdiction by the forum must not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. From the evidence the court found that the defendant had
no contacts with Texas other than this transaction. The court nevertheless
held that these minimum contacts were sufficient to make the defendant
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Texas court. By citing other cases where
the contract between the Texas resident and the foreign corporation provided
for payment in Texas, the court found that the first two factors of the
three-tiered test were met. The defendant, by entering into the contract out
of which the cause of action had arisen and providing for payment in Texas,
had purposefully consummated a transaction within the state. Since the first
two factors were satisfied, the court found that the third was automatically
met. The presence of the first two requirements determines that there is
nothing unfair about forcing the defendant to litigate in Texas.49
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in
47. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
48. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
49. National Truckers Serv., Inc. v. Aero Systems, Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Murdock v. Volvo of America Corp.50 had before it the interesting problem
of whether jurisdiction over a subsidiary corporation is sufficient to confer
jurisdiction over the parent under the Texas long-arm statute. The case
involved a products liability action for damages against Volvo, a Swedish
automobile manufacturer, and its wholly owned American subsidiary,
Volvo of America Corporation, over which in personam jurisdiction existed.
It was claimed by the plaintiffs that jurisdiction existed over Volvo
because it was doing business in Texas through its subsidiary, thus meeting
the provisions of the Texas statute. Article 2031b permits service of process
upon foreign corporations which do business in Texas but have not
designated an agent for such service through the secretary of state. Acts
described by the statute as the doing of business within the state are the
commission of a tort in whole or in part within Texas or the entering into a
contract with a resident of the state to be performed in whole or in part in
Texas. Inasmuch as defendant Volvo did not commit such a tort or enter into
such a contract, it could not be considered within the reach of the Texas
statute unless it was otherwise doing business in the state. Volvo claimed
that it was not, therefore, within the reach of the statute. Consequently, any
exercise of jurisdiction would not comport with due process of law as
demanded by the minimum contacts rule of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington.
The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws5 would permit an
exercise of jurisdiction by a state over a foreign corporation in situations
where the corporation has a relationship to the state which makes an exercise
of jurisdiction reasonable. As to jurisdiction over a foreign parent corpora-
tion, it is stated that if the subsidiary does an act in the state at the direction of
the parent, the state has jurisdiction over the foreign parent. Moreover,
jurisdiction over the subsidiary will establish jurisdiction over the foreign
parent if the foreign parent controls and dominates the subsidiary to such an
extent that it disregards the subsidiary's independent status. The court here
adopted this rule, following Judge Goldberg's language in Product Promo-
tions, Inc. v. Cousteau.52 There it was stated that "the alleged agency and
parent-subsidiary relationships were facts on which jurisdiction was predi-
cated . . . "I' and further, that the plaintiff bears the burden of proof to
establish such facts. In the case at hand the plaintiffs did not present or offer
evidence concerning the degree of domination or control which Volvo
exercised over Volvo of America, nor was proof offered to show whether or
not Volvo of America was the alter-ego of Volvo. Moreover, the burden of
establishing an agency relationship with Volvo as the principal and Volvo of
America as the agent was not met. Therefore, Volvo was not subject to the
reach of the Texas long-arm statute and was not subject to jurisdiction under
the provisions of the statute. The question of lack of due process thus
became immaterial. In the absence of meeting the burden of proof as to
50. 403 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 52.
52. 495 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1974).
53. Id. at 492.
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control or agency, the old case of Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy
Packing Co. 54 controls. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States
maintained the corporate fiction and held that jurisdiction over the subsidiary
did not confer jurisdiction over the parent.
Reich v. Signal Oil & Gas Co. 55 is the most interesting opinion
rendered by the courts during this survey period involving the Texas
long-arm statute and the minimum contacts doctrine of International Shoe
Co. v. Washington. A resident of Louisiana and a resident of Texas who
were working on an oil drilling project off the coast of Ghana were killed
when a helicopter in which they were being transported from the drilling rig
to Ghana crashed. The administratrices of their estates brought actions for
their deaths against several defendants, including an Italian company,
Agusta, which had manufactured the helicopter under license from Bell
Helicopter following a design owned by defendant Bell Helicopter. Bell
clearly does business in Texas and was found subject to jurisdiction. The
helicopter had been sold by Agusta to a British company, Bristow, such sale
and delivery having taken place in either England or Italy. Following the
sale the helicopter had been leased by Bristow to defendant Mayflower
Company, a company subject to Texas judicial jurisdiction. The fact that the
helicopter had never been in Texas should be noted, although after its crash
some metallurgical testing apparently was carried out by Bell in Texas.
Under these facts Agusta and Bristow claimed that long-arm jurisdiction in
Texas could not be maintained against them, and they sought dismissal from
the suit on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. These motions for dismissal
were granted.
At the outset the court stated the requisites for an exercise of jurisdiction
over the persons of nonresident defendants by a federal court: A statute
of the state in which the court is sitting must confer jurisdiction, and an
exercise of jurisdiction in accordance with the statute must also be consistent
with due process of law. As to jurisdiction over Bristow, the court was
of the opinion that the action arose under the tort provision of article 203 1b,
requiring the commission of a tort in whole or in part in Texas. Since the tort
occurred outside of Texas, jurisdiction under the statute did not exist. The
court was also of the opinion that Bristow had made no contract with the
plaintiffs and, therefore, the part of the Texas statute which permits an
exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident who makes a contract with a
Texas resident to be performed in whole or in part in Texas was not met.
Further, even if there were a contract, its existence had not been pleaded by
the plaintiffs.
Previous product liability cases were discussed wherein products
defectively manufactured outside the state had been sent into the state and
had caused injury in Texas.5 6 In these cases the tort had occurred in the state
so as to be in accord with article 2031b. The courts also had bolstered the
54. 267 U.S. 333 (1925).
55. 409 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
56. See, e.g., Coulter v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 426 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1970); Eyerly Aircraft
Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1969).
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mere fact of the commission of the tort in the state with other connections by
the defendant with Texas so as to make it fair and reasonable to require the
defendant to defend within the state. Among the various connections
considered was the fact that the defendant had placed the product in the
stream of interstate commerce and could have foreseen that the product
could have caused injury in Texas. Other activities of the defendant in Texas
were discussed, which, although unrelated to the tort in Texas, added to the
reasonableness and fairness in making the defendant come to the state to be
sued. The court concluded that in the case at hand foreseeability could not be
considered because the product had been placed into the stream of interna-
tional commerce and was never used in the United States. Therefore,
Bristow was not found to be doing business in Texas for purposes of article
203 1b.
At this point the court discussed the due process element of the case,
citing the two-tiered test of Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau which
requires that there must be minimum contacts within the state resulting from
affirmative acts of the defendant and, further, that it must be fair and
reasonable to require the defendant to come into the state and defend.57 To
determine if the first condition of the test had been met, the court circuitously
referred to the earlier determination that Bristow was not doing business
in the state. Since the defendant was not doing business for purposes of the
Texas statute it was concluded that there were no minimum contacts. This
conclusion was reached despite a previous statement by the court that
Bristow had substantial contacts with Texas through its dealings with Bell
Helicopter.
The court's consideration of the second aspect of the test, fairness and
reasonableness to force the nonresident to defend in Texas, was influenced
by two basic factors in long-arm jurisdiction cases set forth in Lone Star
Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp.58 These two factors are the
special interest of the forum in granting relief and the convenience of the
parties. In regard to the first factor the court quoted a cryptic statement in the
Lone Star Motor Import case which concluded that Texas has no special
interest to grant relief in suits against foreign defendants where the cause of
action arose under the laws of another country for conduct outside the
United States. Texas was also found to be no more convenient a forum than
others simply because Bristow had certain contacts with Texas, particularly
after the court considered that actions were already pending in Ghana and in
England, that the crash had occurred in Ghana, and that the helicopter was
manufactured in Italy. Even if it were convenient to bring suit in Texas, that
factor alone was not a sufficient basis for jurisdiction when considered with
all the other findings in the case.
Agusta, the Italian manufacturer of the helicopter, was also held not
subject to Texas judicial jurisdiction. Agusta's cause of action sounded in
tort and for purposes of the Texas statute no tort was committed in whole or
5.7. 495 F.2d at 489.
58. 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex. 1960), rev'd on othergrounds, 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961).
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in part in Texas. Further, since the helicopter was never located in Texas and
since the licensing agreement with Bell forbade competition in the United
States, foreseeability of a tort in Texas could not be imparted to Agusta. It
was acknowledged that a licensing contract had been made by Agusta with
Bell, but this could not meet the contractual aspect of article 2031b, for the
plaintiffs were not a party to this contract or a third party beneficiary of the
contract. Moreover, the plaintiffs did not base their case on a contract
action.
In its discussion the court cited the previously mentioned Texas case of
O'Brien v. Lanpar59 and the three-tiered test set forth by the Texas Supreme
Court. Inasmuch as the cause of action against Agusta did not arise from or
was not connected with a Texas act or transaction, the second part of the
O'Brien test was not met. The court further concluded that since Agusta's
relations with Texas were not sufficiently compelling to require it to defend
itself in Texas in a case where the accident occurred in Ghana and the
alleged negligence occurred in Italy, an assumption of jurisdiction by a
Texas court over Agusta would not constitute fair play and substantial
justice.
The court in Reich probably reached the proper decision, but its
opinion is somewhat prolix and seemingly based upon a theory not really
applicable to the facts. The line of products liability cases relied upon by the
court does not seem appropriate to the relevant fact situation. In these cases
a cause of action, the tort, occurred within Texas, but arose out of negligent
acts of the defendant done elsewhere. The authors of the Restatement
(Second) determined that in products liability cases where an act is done in
one state which produces consequences in another, the latter state may
exercise jurisdiction over causes of action arising from those consequences
if it is reasonable to do so.' The reasonableness of such jurisdiction depends
upon whether the defendant, who had no intention to cause effects in the
state, could reasonably expect or foresee that they might occur, as well as
upon other factors relating to the convenience of the defendant if forced to
stand suit in the state where the tort occurred. In the case at hand the
defendants did no acts outside the state which had the effect of bringing
about a cause of action in Texas. The acts done outside the state had effects
in Ghana. The placing of the helicopter in a stream of international
commerce would make foreseeable the occurrence of a tort in places where
the helicopter was used. Since the helicopter was used in Ghana, that
country could probably exercise jurisdiction over the cause of action, that is,
the tort which occurred there. Jurisdiction in Texas obviously would be
outside the pale under such reasoning.
Nevertheless, this is not the end of the story, for in some instances it is
clear that a state can constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a defendant
even when the cause of action did not arise within the state.6' It is true that a
cause of action arising out of the state could never permit an exercise of
59. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, §§ 37, 50.
61. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l
Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
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jurisdiction under article 203 lb if the statute is confined to a tort committed
in whole or in part within the state or to a contract made with a resident of
Texas to be performed in whole or in part within the state. Article 2031b,
however, also speaks of long-arm jurisdiction over nonresidents who do
business within the state, and doing business is not thought to be confined
only to the tort or contract situations set forth in the statute. The term
includes other acts of doing business. Moreover, although there are conflict-
ing opinions, courts have stated that the Texas statute permits an exercise of
jurisdiction to the fullest possible reach under the constitutional due process
minimum contacts rule.6 2 The Supreme Court of the United States as well as
other courts have stated that the minimum contacts rule is satisfied and
jurisdiction can be exercised over a nonresident defendant even when the
cause of action does not arise out of business done within the state if the
business that is done is of such a continuous and substantial nature as to
make an exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. 63 In Reich the court admitted
that both Bristow and Agusta had "numerous and substantial" business
contacts with Texas, 64 and it would seem that both companies were doing
business in the state. If the Texas statute is as broad as the constitutional
standard, then the court should have contented itself with a determination of
whether the defendants were engaged in such continuous and substantial
business activities within the state so as to make it fair to force the
defendants to defend themselves in Texas on a cause of action not arising
from or connected with those acts or transactions. The contacts of the
defendants with Texas here probably were not so extensive as to require the
defendants to defend in Texas, but a consideration of these Texas contacts as
doing sufficiently substantial business in Texas should have been the
principal thrust of the court's opinion.
II. CHOICE OF LAW
Tort, Warranties, Uniform Commercial Code. The United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas in Morton v. Texas Welding &
Manufacturing Co.65 was faced with a cause of action sounding in tort and
contract. Specifically, the defendant had sold a truck which had been
delivered for use to a subsidiary of the buyer. Plaintiffs, who were
employees of the subsidiary, were injured on June 19, 1969, when the truck
exploded. On June 8, 1971, they sued to recover for these injuries,
complaining of negligence by the manufacturers of the truck as well as
breach of express and implied warranties. Defendant Pat and Chuck Supply
62. Eyerly Aircraft Co. v. Killian, 414 F.2d 591,592 (5th Cir. 1969); National Truckers Serv.,
Inc. v. Aero Systems, Inc., 480 S.W.2d 455, 459 (Tex. Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). See also Thode, In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 203)b, the Texas "Long Arm"
Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance to Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42
TEXAS L. REV. 279, 308 (1964). But see Bland v. Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp., 338 F. Supp. 871
(S.D. Tex. 1971); Hayes v. Caltex Petroleum Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1205 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Baade,
Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 167, 168-73 (1974).
63. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Bryant v. Finnish Nat'l Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426,208 N.E.2d 439,
260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
64. 409 F. Supp. at 851.
65. 408 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
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Company, the retailer, was made a party by an amended complaint of April
15, 1973, and was served with process on April 27, 1973. This defendant
made a motion to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was barred
by the statute of limitations.
Applying the rule of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing
Co.' that a federal court in a diversity action must apply the substantive or
outcome-determinative law, including the conflict of laws rule, of the state
in which it is sitting, the court determined that Texas law should apply.6 7
The tort claim was held to be barred by the Texas statute of limitations
requiring personal injury actions based on negligence to be brought within
two years. Texas law usually characterizes general statutes of limitations as
procedural, 68 and, as to procedure, the law of the forum governs. Therefore,
the Texas limitations period, as that of the forum, was applicable.
A more difficult question was presented by the breach of implied
warranties claim. Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) Texas had classified a personal injury claim based on such a breach
as a tort rather than a contract for statute of limitation purposes. A two-year
period would apply instead of the four-year period prescribed for contract
actions in general. The UCC incorporated in section 2.725 a specific
limitation provision of four years for commencement of suit following the
accrual of the cause of action. The court was, therefore, faced with a case of
first impression as to whether a personal injury action for breach of implied
warranty continued to be governed by the tort limitations period or by the
UCC provision. A federal court in such a case where clear authority does not
exist must through "reason and judicial analysis" determine the case as a
court of the state in which it is sitting would determine it. 69 The court
concluded that the injury complained of arose out of a commercial transac-
tion and in such transactions the Code was created to apply to all aspects
thereof and to provide for uniform rules nationwide governing commercial
transactions. Moreover, the language of the Code specifically includes and
applies to recovery for injuries resulting from breach of warranty.
Inasmuch as the Code period was held applicable, it became necessary
to determine when the four-year period began to run against defendant Pat
and Chuck Supply Company. The Code requires the commencement of an
action for breach within four years after the cause of action accrued. The
court noted that under the Code a breach of warranty occurs at the time of
tender of goods except for warranties which explicitly extend to the future
performance of the goods. Despite this language the court held that the old
Texas rule was still applicable to the effect that the running of the statute
begins when the buyer discovers, or in the exercise of ordinary care should
discover, the injury. Thus, in an action for personal injury grounded upon
breach of implied warranty the period begins to run from the date of injury.
With respect to the claims based on breach of warranty, the court was
66. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
67. 408 F. Supp. at 9.
68. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 15 S.W.2d 1028 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929), rev'd on other
grounds, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
69. 408 F. Supp. at 10.
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of the opinion that a four-year period applied either under pre-Code law
regarding express warranties as contractual or under UCC provisions
covering express warranties, making section 2.725 applicable. Thus, the
cause could proceed only in contract based on breach of warranties.
A most interesting decision in the field of conflict of laws during this
survey period is that of Judge Carl 0. Bue in the case of Continental Oil Co.
v. General American Transportation Co. 70 The plaintiffs sought damages
for defects in forty-six railroad cars which had been purchased from the
defendant manufacturers. Their causes of action were grounded on negli-
gence, strict liability in tort, breach of express and implied warranties, and
breach of contract. The facts demonstrate that the cars were all manufactured
in Ohio. They were then delivered in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Texas.
The contracts of purchase were made in Oklahoma.
The opinion of the court first dealt with the breach of warranties and
breach of contract aspects of the plaintiffs' asserted cause of action. Since
this was a diversity suit the court applied Texas conflict of laws rules.
71
Texas has adopted the Uniform Commercial Code which requires the
application of Texas law "to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to
this state" 72 in causes of action based on breach of contract. Although no
Texas cases have interpreted the meaning of this language, the court was of
the opinion that the facts of the case and the decisions of other jurisdictions
indicated that a Texas court would decide that the transaction involved here
did not bear an appropriate relation to Texas calling for application of Texas
law. It is true that Texas was one of the three states where partial delivery of
the cars was made and that certain repairs of the cars were made in Texas.
These contacts were not sufficient, however, to create a proper nexus
between the events of the case and Texas to warrant the application of Texas
law, particularly when the parties did not have their principal place of
business in Texas at the time of the performance of the contract.
In order to determine the law which Texas would apply, the court
looked to general conflict of laws principles in contract cases and found that
in instances where the contract is to be performed in more than one state the
Texas courts look to the place where the contract was made for the
controlling law. Because the contract was made in Oklahoma the court
determined that the laws of that state would govern. 73 The UCC as adopted
in Oklahoma provides for a five-year limitation period after the cause of
action has accrued. In breach of warranty cases the cause of action begins to
run at the time of delivery, unless a warranty explicitly extends to future
performance. Since there was a seven-year period after the delivery of the
cars and the filing of suit, a suit on breach of implied warranties was barred.
70. 409 F. Supp. 288 (S.D. Tex. 1976).
71. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
72. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 1.105a (Vernon 1968).
73. 409 F. Supp. at 291. The Texas conflicts rule as to contracts seems to be as follows: place
of making governs in an instance where place of making and place of performance are the same;
otherwise place of performance governs unless a different intention is manifested, except, as
would seem to be the case here, where there is more than one place of performance, in which case
in the absence of a contrary manifestation of intention, the place of making governs. The Texas




As to the breach of contract claim, the Oklahoma statute requires suit to
be brought within five years from the date the breach occurs. The court had
not been provided with the relevant Oklahoma law defining date of breach
for purposes of the commencement of the running of the period. In the
absence of knowledge of the relevant law the court refused to consider
whether the contract action was barred until such information was supplied.
The usual manner in which the Texas courts deal with absence of proof of
foreign law or a request for judicial notice of sister state law and a proper
showing of such law is to presume the law of the other state to be the same as
that of Texas. 4 It would appear that the federal court failed to follow Texas
law on this point.
Plaintiffs also claimed that an express warranty had been made which
was explicitly extended to future performance. If such were true, and
following the Oklahoma Commercial Code, the cause of action did not
accrue until such time when the breach was or should have been discovered.
Inasmuch as there was an issue of material fact as to whether or not there
existed an express warranty covering future performance, summary judg-
ment on this issue was precluded.
It should be noted that a divergence exists between Judge Bue's
opinion here and Judge Singleton's opinion in the Morton case discussed
above. Judge Singleton treated the statute of limitations as procedural
because Texas courts would so characterize it, and thus applied the law of
the forum. He assumed-that the limitations provisions of the UCC were also
procedural. Judge Bue, however, treated those limitations provisions as
substantive, thereby calling for the application of the Texas conflict of laws
principle applicable to substance, not procedure. In this case Oklahoma law
would be applied as the law of the place where the contract was made. 7
Texas, as noted in the previous case, has a four-year limitation period in
breach of implied warranty cases under the UCC and a four-year period for
breach of contract actions. It would seem to make little difference here
whether the Texas four-year period were applied or the Oklahoma five-year
period, for the period would have run in either instance. A difference might
exist as to the breach of contract clause, for the Texas statute is a year shorter
than that of Oklahoma and whether the statute had run would depend upon
when it began to run.7 6 Thus, a four-year Texas statute could have run,
whereas a five-year statute in Oklahoma might not have.
The court then turned its attention to the tort aspects of the complaint. It
will be remembered that the plaintiffs' complaint set forth causes of action
based not only upon breach of contract and of warranty, but also upon
74. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
75. It would seem that courts construing the statute of limitations of the United States have
believed it to be procedural in that the Code did not create a new cause of action. Thus, the statute
of limitation of the forum is applicable. See Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581 (5th Cir.
1972); Lewis v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., John Bean Div., 245 F. Supp. 195 (W.D. Mich.
1965); Natale v. Upjohn Co., 236 F. Supp. 37 (D. Del. 1964); Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v.
Fairbanks Morse, Inc., 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1973).
76. The limitation period as noted Was from the time of the breach according to the UCC, but
authority seems nonexistent in a case such as this to aid in determination of when the breach




negligence and strict liability. The court, stating that under conflict of iaws
principles characterization is a task for the forum court 77 and that a federal
court must follow the characterization of the state in which it is sitting,
78
concluded that a Texas court would characterize an action in strict liability
as a tort, and since Texas still applies the law of place of injury to all
substantive tort issues, the federal court must look to the law of the place of
injury, the lex loci delicti. 79 The problem here is locating the place of injury
or damage. The design and manufacture of the cars took place in Ohio, the
contract for such cars was entered into in Oklahoma, and the cars were
delivered to plaintiffs in Pennsylvania, Texas, and Ohio. The defects in the
cars, cracks which developed, took place over several years so that it would
be impossible to point to a particular place where the damage occurred.
Thus, the place of wrong or injury demanded by Texas law could not really
be discovered. The federal court was uncertain as to which state's law would
be chosen by a Texas court, but still it had to choose the law which a Texas
court would be most likely to adopt. It was pointed out that the court had
been urged to follow a choice of law rule which would include within the
meaning of place of injury the place where the wrongful act or omission had
taken place.80 It was this approach that was followed, and although no Texas
case was found where a Texas court had been unable to determine the place
of injury, it was believed that Texas in a case such as that at hand would
characterize the wrongful act or omission as having occurred in Ohio, the
place of manufacture. The court noted that a few Texas cases had defined
the lex loci delicti to include the place where the wrongful act or neglect had
occurred, although in the cases relied upon by the court the injury had also
occurred there. Ohio law was held applicable, therefore, and recovery was
permitted upon a theory of strict liability. The court said that Pennsylvania
would also permit recovery, but that Texas would probably deny it on
commercial loss, and that the issue had not been resolved in Oklahoma.
The parties had also urged alternatively that the court resort to a most
significant relationship or interest analysis choice of law rule. Use of the law
of the forum as the better reasoned majority view was further suggested.
These requests were rejected on the ground that Texas had not adopted such
approaches 81 and that the federal court must apply Texas choice of law
principles as demanded by the Supreme Court of the United States.
82
It was opined that there was a substantial possibility that Texas might in
the future and in the proper case adopt the most significant contacts rule
rather than a mere application of the lex loci delicti. If such were the rule in
this case it was determined that Ohio law would govern because that state
had the most significant interest in imposing strict liability upon manufac-
77. The general rule in conflict of laws is that characterization of conflict of laws concepts is
determined by the law of the forum. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 7(2).
78. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
79. 409 F. Supp. at 294; see Click v. Thuron Indus., Inc., 475 S.W.2d 715,716 (Tex. 1972);
Brown v. Seltzer, 424 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
80. The court cited among other cases Lee v. Howard, 483 S.W.2d 922, 923 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
81. See Marmonv. Mustang Aviation, lnc.,430S.W.2d 182(Tex. 1968);Thomas, Conflict of
Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 244, 258-59 (1975).
82. 409 F. Supp. at 296; see Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3 (1975).
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turers domiciled and doing business in Ohio. The other states where the
deliveries occurred or where the contract was entered into would have
inferior interests to those of the state of manufacture.
Wrongful Death-Statute of Limitations. Penry v. Wm. Barr, Inc.83
involved a wrongful death action brought in a United States district court
sitting in Texas for injury and death which had occurred in Louisiana. The
suit was time-barred by the Louisiana one-year limitation period which was
built into the Louisiana wrongful death statute. It was not time-barred by the
longer Texas statutory period of two years. The court noted the opinion of
the Supreme Court of the United States in Day Zimmerman, Inc. v.
Challoner84 to the effect that under the Erie Railway85 and Klaxon86
doctrines the federal court must apply the conflict of laws principles of the
state in which it is sitting. Therefore, Texas conflict of laws principles were
applicable. If Texas were a lex loci delicti jurisdiction Texas courts would
apply the Louisiana wrongful death statutes, including the built-in litigation
period of Louisiana, because the Louisiana statute was considered to be
peremptive of the right, and thus substantive rather than procedural in
nature.
It was argued that, despite the Texas Supreme Court decision in
Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 87 the Texas wrongful death statute and
its two-year limitation period should apply. The court in Marmon had stated
that the Texas wrongful death statute could not be applied extraterritorially
to an injury or wrong occurring outside the state because the legislature had
written into the statute words which required the application of the wrongful
death statute of the lex loci delicti, the place of the wrong or injury. The
plaintiffs, however, pointed to the fact that the Texas wrongful death statute
had been amended and that it now permits recovery if a right of action is
given by a wrongful death statute of the foreign state or of Texas.8 This
amendment would, it was argued, permit Texas courts to adopt the most
significant relationship theory as to wrongful death actions and to apply the
law of the place having the most significant relationship. In this case the
place would be Texas, because the plaintiffs were Texas residents at the
time of the death of the deceased and were presently residents of Texas. As a
result, the Texas two-year limitation should control. The court noted the
amendment and was of the opinion that the Texas wrongful death statute can
now be given extraterritorial effect, but after analysis of the wrongful death
provisions and the amendment the court stated: "[I]t is not clear in a case
such as this whether to apply the law of the state where the cause of action
occurred or the state with the most significant contacts." 89
In the Survey of last year this author was of the opinion that the
amendment's wording was unclear and that it seemingly was an act of
83. 415 F. Supp. 126 (E.D. Tex. 1976).
84. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
85. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 84 (1938).
86. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
87. 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968); see Thomas, supra note 81, at 258-59.
88. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT ANN. art. 4678 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
89. 415 F. Supp. at 128.
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legislative improvisation giving the Texas courts wide leeway and freeing
them from the legislative straitjacket imposed prior to the amendment. 90
The federal district court in the case at hand was able to escape deciding how
a Texas court would rule under the amendment because it was held that the
amendment did not become effective until September 1, 1975, while the
cause of action accrued upon the death of the decedent December 18, 1974.
Thus, the Louisiana limitation period and the cause of action had expired
under Louisiana law eight months before the amendment became effective.
Since Texas has a strict provision against retroactive laws 91 which disturb
vested rights, and since the defendant had a vested right to rely on the statute
of limitations as a defense after the cause of action had become barred
thereby, the state legislature could not divest the defendant of his right.
Alternatively the plaintiff contended that the Louisiana limitation period
should be tolled as to the minor children who were also plaintiffs in the case
in accordance with the rule that such period was interrupted during minority
status. The court disagreed, stating that the Louisiana statute was one of
peremption, and that rights under the statute must be exercised in one year,
otherwise they no longer existed even for minors.
92
Marriage. Durr v. Newman93 illustrates once again the pitfalls of a failure
to request the judge to take judicial notice of sister state law and the further
failure to furnish him information to permit compliance with the request as
required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 184a. Here there was a contested
hearing in an application for appointment as administratrix by a wife. A
judgment was entered which found that the woman was the common law
wife of the deceased and granted her application. Upon appeal a remand was
sought so that Nevada law could be presented properly to the court.
Appellant claimed that the marriage was celebrated in Nevada, that common
law marriages were invalid in Nevada, and under the well-known
choice of law rule that the law of the place of celebration of the marriage
controls the validity of the marriage, the marriage was invalid.94 Appellant
had sought to call the trial court's attention to Nevada law by filing a written
90. This author stated the following in Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 268, 292 (1976):
The amendment now permits recovery if a right of action is given by the law of the
foreign state or country or Texas. Would this require the Texas courts to apply
Texas law in any instance where the law of the foreign state did not provide a
cause of action, or the law of the foreign state in any instance when that law
granted a cause of action and Texas did not? For example, what if Texas did adopt
the interest analysis approach? Would the courts be forced to apply Texas law in a
case simply because Texas gave a cause of action and the foreign law did not
when Texas contacts were minimal and Texas had little or no interest in the
application of its law to the transaction? Alternatively, would Texas be forced to
apply the foreign law when the foreign place's interests were minimal because
that jurisdiction gave a cause of action and Texas did not? Such a construction of
the statute would be a dubious one. It would seem that the amendment allows
Texas courts some discretion in deciding to apply Texas substantive law to
injuries which occur outside the state. To guide that discretion, the choice-of-law
rules followed by the courts of Texas would be relevant.
91. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 16.
92. For discussion of the Louisiana wrongful death statute and its limitation period see
Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 159, 162-64 (1969).
93. 537 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
94. See In re May's Estate, 305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 4 (1953). For discussion see R.
WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 168-73 (1971).
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brief, but this was not placed in the record. In the absence of proper motion
for judicial notice as called for by rule 184a, the court refused to take judicial
notice of sister state law. In such instances the Texas courts presume the law
of the state which should govern to be the same as that of Texas. 95 Common
law marriages are valid in Texas. The court of civil appeals noted that a
reversal and remana would only be appropriate in this case if there were
reversible error present. Since there was no error in the lower court's
judgment, no reversal or remand was appropriate.
Antenuptial Agreements. In Frey v. Estate of George S. Sargent96 the court
of civil appeals had before it a rather rare type of contract. The contract was
executed in Oklahoma and by its terms the husband agreed to execute a will
bequeathing $30,000 to the wife in consideration for her care of him at her
home in Texas or at a home that they might acquire in Texas. Following the
marriage the husband executed in Oklahoma a will bequeathing the money
to the wife. The wife died at their home in Texas some years later. By the
terms of Texas law the bequest lapsed. Thereafter, the husband executed
another will revoking prior wills. He failed to include the bequest previously
made to the wife. At his death lineal descendants of the wife filed claim for
the $30,000. The trial court denied the claim and the court of civil appeals
affirmed.
It was contended that the law of the place of making of the prenuptial
contract, Oklahoma, should govern. Oklahoma law would sanction recovery
under the agreement. The court, however, applied what appears to be
the Texas conflicts rule that where place of making and place of performance
are different, the law of the place of performance governs if, as here,
there is only one place of performance. 97 Such a conclusion is reinforced in
the case like the one at hand where a place of performance was designated in
the contract. It was noted that the consideration for the bequest was the
performance of services by the wife which were all to take place in Texas.
Therefore, the law of Texas, as the place of performance, governed, and the
contract was not enforced.
Federal Common Law. Kimbell Foods, Inc. v. Republic National Bank98
brings to the fore once again the question of federal common law. In Erie
Railroad v. Tompkins," a diversity case, the Supreme Court of the United
States held that there was no federal general common law and, thus, the
federal courts were required to apply the law of the state in which they were
sitting. Later cases, however, have softened this absolute negative. Today,
when a matter is governed by a federal statute it is quite clear that the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution governs and makes the
federal, not state, law applicable. Consequently, congressional legislation
does away with many conflicts as to what law should govern. There may
well be instances, however, when a particular issue is not explicitly covered
95. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
96. 533 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. For discussion of the Texas choice-of-law rule in contract situations see note 73 supra.
98. 401 F. Supp. 316 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
99. See note 85 supra and accompanying text.
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by federal statute. The problem then becomes whether such gaps are to be
governed by state law, following Erie's proclamation that no federal
general common law exists, or whether, when federal rights are involved,
the issue is to be governed by a federal common law rule. The Supreme
Court of the United States has determined that if the matter is such that it
should not be governed by rules followed in diversity cases, then the
statutory lacunae are to be filled by a federal common law."°
This federal common law reasoning prevailed in the case at hand where
suit was brought to quiet title and foreclose liens on personal property in
which an interest by the United States was claimed as a result of a lien
arising from the default of a creditor whose loan was guaranteed by the
Small Business Administration (SBA). The federal court observed that
jurisdiction was based upon a federal statute and concluded that it was
established that federal law is applicable when a debt owed to the United
States is in issue. The court stated that the reason for its conclusion was that
a uniform federal law was necessary to protect the United States Government
in the exercise of its governmental functions and that such functions
should not be subject to conflicting state laws.' 0'
The rule of first in time first in right fixes priority between a federal and
a state created lien. In order to be entitled to priority, however, the
non-federal lien must be choate at the time the federal lien arises; this
requirement is met only if the identity of the lienor, the property subject to
the lien, and the amount of the lien are established. The last condition is met
only when there is no further opportunity to contest the amount. This means
that the lienor must have reduced the claim to judgment or the lien must be
enforceable by a summary judgment.
The claims of the Kimbell Food Company rested upon charges for
goods sold on open account to the food store chain which had defaulted on
its guaranteed SBA loan. The purchases and charges were made after the
security interest of the SBA attached, but the court said that even if they had
been made previous to the SBA attachment, the Kimbell lien would not have
been choate prior to the governmental interest because the amount was not
certain in that there was still judicial opportunity to question the lien until it
was reduced to judgment. Such reduction did not come to pass until after the
attachment of the SBA lien. Moreover, the court felt that Texas law would
not recognize these claims as choate despite the contention of Kimbell that
future advance clauses found in certain earlier security and financing
agreements with the defaulting food store applied also to secure purchases
on open account. The court disagreed with Kimbell and said that under
Texas law an agreement securing all other indebtedness of any kind arising
between parties means future indebtedness of the same nature as that
previously described in the agreement and the later purchases on open
account were not of the same class as the previous indebtedness represented
by the agreements.
100. This doctrine is set out in Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Powell, 352 U.S.
29 (1956); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See also R. LEFLAR,
supra note 2, at 154-56; R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 94, at 464-66.
101. 401 F. Supp. at 321.
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As to priority of certain tax liens of the State of Texas and the city of
Dallas, their priority was based upon federal statute, not federal common
law. 0 2 This statute, as interpreted, does not apply to state sales taxes but
does include ad valorem taxes. Liens were sought for both types. The court
held that in any event such liens could not prevail against the SBA claim.
The sale of the defaulted supermarket's three stores had been made to obtain
funds for settlement, to the extent possible, of all claims. Since the city's
lien and the state's lien were not destroyed by the bulk sale of the collateral
and they could pursue their liens against the purchasers of the collateral,
their liens were not destroyed and they had no right to pursue the proceeds of
the sale which had been placed in escrow.
III. LEGITIMATION
Extra-state Consequences. A situation not often before the courts of
Texas arose in Wickware v. Session"0 3 and involved the consequences of
the legitimation by the father of children born out of wedlock. The children
were born and domiciled in California. The father also was domiciled in
California before and after the birth of the children. Pursuant to a suit in that
state by the mother for the support of the children the father acknowledged
paternity, which according to California law made the illegitimate children
the heirs of the father. After the father's death a California court ordered the
assignment of his estate to the children. The California suit made no
mention of Texas real property, the subject matter of the Texas suit in a
trespass to try title action by the children claiming rights of inheritance in the
land owned by the deceased father. The trial court in Texas gave full faith
and credit to the California proceeding and considered the children legitimate
upon proper acknowledgment by the father in accordance with
California law. The court of civil appeals affirmed to the extent of
recognition of the status of the children as legitimate under California law
for purposes of inheriting Texas land.
It is well known that legitimacy for purposes of land inheritance is
ultimately to be determined by the law of the situs of the land.l°0 Neverthe-
less, the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws declares that the status
of legitimacy is subject to the law of the state which has the most significant
relationship with the parent. It is interesting to note that the court of civil
appeals refers to the Restatement (Second) rule and adopts for Texas the
most significant relationship principle of conflict of laws for legitimation
even though this choice of law principle has not officially been accepted by
the Supreme Court of Texas. 0
The more difficult question of determining the state with the most
significant relationship remained. Without attempting an interest analysis,
the court simply stated that California was the place where the parent and
child were domiciled at the time the act took place which created the status
102. 15 U.S.C. § 646 (1970).
103. 538 S.W.2d 466 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 237(I).
105. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
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of legitimation, and where the parent and child are domiciled in the same
state at the time of legitimation, only that state has an interest in imposing
legitimation on the father and in creating the status for the child. 106
Therefore, its law governs.
The court of civil appeals sidestepped the issue as to whether full faith
and credit should be given to the judicial proceedings in California, stating
in a footnote that the recognition of the status of legitimacy was only a
matter of comity, not of constitutional law and full faith and credit. In the
next sentence, however, the court cited an Ohio case °7 which had found it
proper to give full faith and credit to a sister state judgment which
established a status of legitimacy. Generally, recognition ci the status of
legitimacy depends upon whether a sister state's law views certain acts of
the parents as acknowledgment, and it has been held that full faith and credit
need not be given to a sister state statute conferring legitimacy. When the
status is established by a sister state judgment, however, much stricter full
faith and credit requirements are demanded by doctrine of the Supreme
Court of the United States. If the judgment is based upon jurisdiction, it
must be accorded full faith and credit subject to a limited number of
exceptions. Thus, if domicile is the basis of jurisdiction for determination of
status, then a judgment based thereon should be granted full faith and credit
by another state.10 8
It is refreshing to note in this case that the parties relying on California
law took the proper steps to meet the provisions of Texas rule 184a so that
judicial notice could be taken by the Texas court of the sister state law. That
rule requires that a motion be made to the judge to take judicial notice of the
law of another state and that sufficient information be given to the judge
concerning the law so that he is able to comply. Sufficient notice must also
be given to the adverse party so that the latter can prepare to meet the
request. An attack was made in the case at hand upon the fact that the judge
took judicial notice of the sister state law, the contention being made that
such law must be pleaded and proved as fact. The court correctly pointed out
that pleading and proof as to sister state law was no longer required after the
adoption of the judicial notice rule. Here, the motion had been made to the
judge and a copy of the California law was submitted. The adverse parties
also argued that they did not have sufficient notice. It was true that objection
was made as to lack of proper notice when the judge was requested to take
judicial notice. These parties did not require a recess or continuance to give
them time to prepare for the action, however, despite the fact that a ten-day
recess was offered so that a proper copy of the California statute could be
obtained. Under these conditions it was believed that the parties were not
denied an opportunity to meet the request for judicial notice.
IV. FOREIGN EXECUTOR
Suit Outside State of Appointment. At common law the rule emerged that an
106. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 287.
107. Howells v. Limbeck, 172 Ohio St. 297, 175 N.E.2d 517 (1961).
108. On full faith and credit to a judgment see note 12 supra.
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administrator could neither sue nor be sued in his official capacity outside
the state of his appointment.1°9 This traditional rule has for the most part
been the rule in Texas where it has been recognized that a foreign
representative is an officer of the court appointing him, deriving his
authority from that court, and, therefore, is empowered to administer the
assets only within the jurisdiction of the appointing court. 110 The prime
reason for the rule was well stated in the old Texas case of Terrell v.
Crane:...
This is based upon the principle that one state should not have
extraterritorial jurisdiction over assets of a deceased person; otherwise
these assets might be exhausted or withdrawn to the detriment of
domestic creditors, who have the right to have them administered
under the laws of their own state, and to whose jurisdiction they are
naturally subjected .... 112
The court of civil appeals in Eikel v. Bristow Corp."3 substantiated
this rule with some exception. Suit was instituted by the Houston National
Bank as payee of certain promissory notes against one Bristow and others
who had endorsed and guaranteed the notes. While the action was pending,
Bristow died. Eikel qualified as testamentary executor in Louisiana. The
cause of action, the notes, and the guarantee agreements were assigned to
the executor by the bank upon a payment of $25,000. Following Bristow's
death, a suggestion of death was filed in the suit against him and others. The
executor then voluntarily answered for the deceased. After assignment of
the cause of action to him by the bank, the trial court permitted him to
substitute as plaintiff in the case which proceeded to trial on the bank's
pleading. Judgment was entered by the trial court which, among other
things, decreed that the plaintiff take nothing as to Bristow, the deceased.
The court of civil appeals recognized the general rule that a foreign
executor cannot maintain suit in his representative capacity in Texas, but
affirmed the right of the executor to maintain the suit despite the fact that he
was a foreign executor and no ancillary administration had been obtained in
Texas. The court quoted from the Texas Supreme Court opinion in Terrell
v. Crane which recognized an exception to the general rule where title has
been directly vested into the administrator, as when made payable to him, or
when judgment has been previously recovered in his name. 1 4 Therefore,
Eikel was "asserting his own right rather than one of the deceased and the
notes in question were assets in his hands for which he was entitled to sue in
his personal capacity.""' 5
Eikel's defense of the suit in Texas as executor of the deceased was not,
however, permitted. The court noted the Texas rule" 6 that where there are
two or more plaintiffs or defendants in a suit and one or more of them dies,
109. H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 18, at 366.
110. Faulkner v. Reed, 241 S.W. 1002 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1922, holding approved).
I1. 55 Tex. 81 (1881).
112. Id. at 82.
113. 529 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, no writ).
114. 55 Tex. at 82.
115. 529 S.W.2d at 801.
116. TEX. R. Civ. P. 155.
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the suit may proceed in the name of the surviving plaintiffs or against the
surviving defendants. Bristow's death removed him as a party, and Eikel as
a foreign executor had no standing to continue the suit as representative of
the decedent.

